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Abstract 
Since McCallum’s (1995) finding of surprisingly high border effect on trade between US 
and Canada, there have been a number of studies on other parts of the world, and 
improvements made to the gravity model to accurately measure this effect. This paper 
suggests some other modifications to the model, and applies it to a region of the world 
that presents a distinctly interesting case. Changes in border effects of formerly socialist 
countries in Central and East Europe, and countries in the former Soviet Union are 
analyzed during 1976-2002 at country and sectoral levels, and also with respect to blocs 
of countries. A discussion on cross-country variations in border effects follows the 
computations.  
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1.  Introduction 
National borders are artificially man made and they do not necessarily follow natural 
boundaries set by rivers, seas, or mountains. Hence, especially for countries that have free trade 
agreements, they should not constitute a trade barrier. The empirical literature on border effects 
started by McCallum (1995) provides contradictory evidence. Quite the opposite is the finding of 
the empirical research done on different parts of the world. While border effects are shown to get 
smaller with time, they are significant. Crossing borders still constitutes a cost in terms of trade 
flows.  
Alesina (2002) argues the meaning of national borders is changing as decentralization is 
under way in many countries, and supernational unions are becoming increasingly common. The 
former erects legislative barriers within regions of a country due to cross-regional differences in 
laws and regulations. In contrast, the latter weakens national borders as countries are delegating 
some of their functions to multinational organizations resulting in harmonization of trade 
impeding laws and regulations. Within this framework, Wolf (2000) analyzes the regional level 
border effects to find that regions within countries are not fully integrated. 
The formerly socialist countries present an interesting case in the study of border effects. 
During the last decade or so, they experienced integration and disintegration at the same time at 
various degrees with different blocs of countries. During socialism, the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (CMEA) isolated these countries from the rest of the World. However, 
they were trading without trade barriers with each other. Infrastructure was designed to facilitate 
intra-CMEA trade. Trade was centrally planned; high degree of specialization was the preference 
of the planners. As a result, for over 50 years, they traded like one country with substantial 
limitations on trade with the outside World. With the fall of socialism in late 1980s, Central and   2
East European countries (CEEC) distanced themselves from the former Soviet Republics (FSR), 
Russia in particular, and reoriented themselves towards the West with a number of arrangements 
including the trade liberalizing Europe Agreements. In other words, their disengagement with 
CMEA countries marched side by side in 1990s with their reintegration with the World (Baldwin 
1993, Maurel 1998, and Nilson 2000). Now, eight of these countries are European Union (EU) 
members. Furthermore, as an extreme case of decentralization, Czechoslovakia (CZSK) broke 
into two countries, and five independent countries emerged from the ashes of former Yugoslavia. 
In the East, the Soviet Union broke into 15 independent republics. While three Baltic countries 
took the same route as CEEC, the others tried to maintain their relationship at various degrees. 
While raising national borders among FSR due to independence is expected to create a border 
effect that did not theoretically exist before, the formation of a loose Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) in early 1990s, and a custom union among few members of CIS 
(CISCU) in late 1990s were meant to keep this effect to a minimum. Lingering effects of the 
infrastructure of the past is also shown to have some implications on their current intra-region 
trade (Kandogan, 1999). Similarly, the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) was formed 
in the mid 1990s among CEEC. Dates of integration and disintegration of these blocs are given 
Table 1 for each transition country.     
The objective of this paper is to first assess the changes in border effects over time in this 
region by taking into account the improvements made to the McCallum’s model and making its 
own modifications. A discussion of models from the literature is presented in Section 2. Border 
effects are measured both at country level and sectoral level. They are also measured against 
country blocs such as the EU, CEEC, FSR, and former Yugoslav republics (FYR) to observe   3
how reintegration and disintegration are shaping over time. A discussion follows the 
measurements in Section 3. 
 
2.  Gravity models 
 
The regression model based on McCallum (1995) takes the following form: 
(1)                                                              ) ( 2 1 ij ij j ij j i ij d ln Y ln Y ln X ln ε λ γ ρ β β α + + + + + =  
where Xij is the exports of partner country i to country j. Yi  and Yj are their gross domestic 
products, respectively. dij is the distance between their capitals. For domestic trade of the 
importer country, a measure of internal distance is used. Natural logs of these variables are used 
in the analysis.  ij λ is the home-country dummy variable, which is 1 for domestic trade when i 
equals j. Separate home-country dummy variables are used for each importer country. Their 
domestic trade is computed by subtracting the value of exports from the value of production. The 
border effect is obtained by taking the exponential of the home-country dummy variable’s 
coefficient. This effect represents the ratio of domestic trade to international trade of a country 
after controlling for distance and size of the partners’ economies. McCallum applied this model 
to Canada to compare inter-provincial trade to international trade. Researchers who adopted 
McCallum’s model typically carried out separate regressions for each year to observe the 
changes in the border effect across time. 
In the absence of provincial or state level data, one needs to find an alternative way of 
measuring the internal distances. Gravity models provide more accurate results if other aspects 
linked to the existence of border effects are controlled and measured accurately. In this respect, 
the measurement of internal distance is particularly important. If internal distances are 
overestimated relative to international distances, border effects will be inflated. Helliwell (1998)   4
finds that border effect estimates are very sensitive to the definition and measurement of internal 
distance. 
In the literature, the measures of internal distance fall under three categories: Portion of 
distance between capital and nearest capital (Wei, 1996; Wolf, 2000), area based measures 
(Nitsch, 2000; Redding and Venables, 2000; Head and Mayer, 2000), and weighted average 
measures (Helliwell and Verdier, 2001). Wei (1996) uses ¼ of distance between the capital and 
the nearest capital of neighboring countries to measure the internal distance. Area based 
measures assume that the economic center is at the center of a circle. Accordingly, the internal 
distance is 0.67 times the square root of the ratio of area to π. However, the selection of the 
economic center is a source of bias, if the country is large and has multiples of economic centers. 
Furthermore, both of these measures suffer from using a different technique for measuring 
internal distances and international distances. Helliwell and Verdier (2001) use average weighted 
distance for the five largest cities for both distances using GDP shares (or population shares) as 
weights. It is obtained as follows: 
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Other than the measurement of internal distance, McCallum’s and other similar models, 
suffer from a lack of theoretical foundation. Anderson (1979) asserts that trade between two 
regions is decreasing relative to bilateral and multilateral resistances. Trade resistance is 
decomposed into  bilateral trade barriers between partner countries, and each country’s 
multilateral resistance to trade with all of their partners. McCallum’s model does not include any 
form of these resistances. Some empirical models derived from McCallum use an atheoretical   5
remoteness variable based on distance for multilateral resistance such as Manchin and Pinna 
(2004). However, without theoretical foundation, their results are biased due to omitted 
variables. In fact, border effects are expected to be lower if a theoretically grounded gravity 
equation is used.  
Within this framework, Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) argue that McCallum’s 
unexpectedly large border effect is a consequence of omitted variable bias and the small 
domestic economic size of Canada. They modify McCallum’s equation by adding multilateral 
resistance variables for both partners to address resistance in each to trade with all of their 
partners. Additionally, they assert that in a theoretically grounded gravity model, income 
elasticities should be one. Hence, the regression equation becomes:   
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i P ~ is the multilateral resistance term for country i. These resistance terms are 
computed using non-linear least squares estimation to minimize sums of squares of errors under 
constraints. Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) apply this method to compute the border effects, 
which turn out to be much smaller than those of McCallum as expected. 
Although this technique consistently and efficiently estimates a theoretical gravity 
equation, it is computationally heavy. It requires custom programming to solve for the resistance 
terms from a system of equations. Furthermore, price indexes are used in estimation which do 
not accurately reflect the true border effects. An alternative is to replace multilateral resistance 
terms with source and destination country specific fixed effects as in Harrigan (1996), Hummels 
(1999), Redding and Venables (2000). They control for origin and destination price levels and 
any other regional idiosyncrasies by importer and exporter country fixed effects. These country 
fixed effects are used to control for the countries’ heterogeneity. Omitting them would   6
overestimate the border effect due to model misspecification. Their model is similar to the 
following of Feenstra (2002): 
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where δi and δj  are the fixed effects for the exporter and the importer countries, respectively. 
Separate home-country dummy variables are used for each importer country.   
This approach estimates the border effects without explicitly dealing with resistance 
terms. It also leads to consistent estimates of the model’s parameters. The main advantage is that 
ordinary least squares can be used without any need for complicated computations. While using 
resistance terms would result in more efficient estimates, Feenstra (2002) asserts that this benefit 
is small compared to computational simplicity of fixed effects approach. 
  In the empirical literature, separate regressions are carried out to observe changes in 
border effects over time. This goal could be achieved more simply in one regression with the 
addition of year fixed effect variable that are interacted with home-country dummy variables to 
the model, and thus obtaining separate home-country dummy variables for each country-year 
pair.  
Furthermore, the empirical models in the literature do not accurately account for the 
bilateral resistance term of Anderson (1979). Some models attempt to do this by adding common 
border and language dummy variables or incorporate historical ties, but they still suffer from 
omitted variable bias due to the atheoretical nature of these variables. In another framework, 
Egger, Peter and Michael Pfaffermayr (2003) suggest adding bilateral fixed effects to the model 
to control all influences to the trade of a country pair in addition to those mentioned above, 
including agreements between the two countries. This approach could also be applied to a 
gravity model for the purpose of measuring the border effects. Note however that this approach 
will have a generally increasing impact on border effects since trade promoting bilateral factors   7
are now controlled. The increase will be more substantial for countries that primarily trade with 
partners that are culturally close, whether that cultural proximity is due to being a neighboring 
country, or speaking the same language or having similar institutions resulting from having 
historical ties.  
With the addition of separate home-country dummy variables for each country-year pair 
and the bilateral fixed effects, the model becomes: 
(5)                                                        ) ( 3 2 1 ijt ijt jt ij ij j i jt it ijt d ln Y Y X ln ε λ γ ρ δ β δ β δ β + + + + + =  
where  ij δ is the bilateral fixed effect between countries i and j.  ijt λ  represents the home-country 
dummy variables for each country-year pair, obtained by interacting the home-country dummy 
variables with year fixed effect variables. Note that year fixed effects variables by themselves are 
not included so that the changes in border effects over time can be accurately measured. 
Especially for countries that are experiencing integration and/or disintegration, it would 
be interesting to measure changing border effects with their old partners or new partners. For that 
purpose, the model in equation (5) can be modified to allow border effects against country blocs, 
representing old or new partners, rather than border effects against all partners. This can be done 
by adding bloc dummy variables specific for partners in a country bloc, in addition to the usual 
home-country dummy variables against all partners. Bloc dummy variables take the value of 1 if 
the trade is with a partner from a bloc b, and 0 otherwise.  
(6)                                                       ) ( 2 1 ijt
b
ijt
b
jt ijt jt ij j i jt it ijt d ln Y Y X ln ε λ γ λ γ ρ δ β δ β + + + + + =  
where border effects of country j against bloc b countries can be obtained by taking the 
exponential of the difference in coefficients of  ijt λ and 
g
ijt λ . In other words, -
g
ijt λ  measures border 
effects of j with bloc b relative to j’s other partners. Note that bilateral fixed effects are removed 
from this model to eliminate multicollinearity with bloc dummy variables.     8
  Lastly, Chen (2002) examined the border effects at the sector level to find significant 
variation in border effects across sectors. Modifying the above model, sector level border effects 
could be obtained using the following: 
(7)                                                                      ) ( 2 1
s
ijt
s
ijt
s
jt ij j i jt it
s
ijt d ln Y Y X ln ε λ γ ρ δ β δ β + + + + =  
3.  Results 
 
In this section, the regression models discussed earlier are applied to imports of transition 
countries. Trade data is obtained from the UN COMTRADE database.  Production data comes 
from the World Bank production database and UNIDO, and the OECD. Data on gross domestic 
product is obtained from the UN common database. International and domestic distances are 
obtained from CEPII. The availability of the data on trade and production were restrictive in 
determining the period of analysis as data did not exist for all countries for every sector for every 
year. The period of analysis for each transition country is given in Appendix 1.    
Different industrial classification systems are used in the two sources of production data 
(ISIC revisions 2 and 3 at three- and four- digit levels), and in the source for trade (SITC revision 
1 at 4 digit level). Therefore, some conversions are needed before the analysis can be carried out. 
The conversions between different classification systems are based on the guidelines provided by 
the UN Statistics Division, which can be found in Appendix 2. In computing the internal trade, 
two-digit level ISIC sectors are used. These are then aggregated to obtain the country level 
figures.    
Figure 1 shows the changes in border coefficients across time in six of the former Soviet 
republics using various measures of internal distance in McCallum’s (1995) model. Separate 
regressions are run for each year. It is observed that the overall pattern across time and relative 
magnitudes of border coefficients are more or less similar in three measures of internal distance.   9
However, using ¼ of the distance between the capital of a country and the nearest capital of a 
neighboring country implies significantly lower border effects. Using this measure, border 
effects are especially underestimated for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan which have capitals fairly 
close to each other. The difference in coefficients obtained using the area based measure of 
internal distance and its weighted distance measure produce quite similar values for border 
coefficients. The area based measure seems to work particularly well in comparison to weighted 
measure for small Baltic States. However, the selection of the economic center city is a source of 
bias for large countries in especially FSR. Furthermore, given that same formula is used for both 
internal and external distances, weighted distance measure is chosen in the following analyses.  
According to McCallum’s (1995) model, right after the Soviet Union dissolved, border 
effects in its republics were quite high, ranging from almost 2300 in Kyrgyzstan to 192 in 
Estonia in 1992. All three Baltic States which broke their ties with the Russian Federation and 
reoriented their trade towards the West not only had the lowest border effects during the whole 
period of analysis, but also experienced a steady decrease in its size. While other FSR also 
experienced a decrease at first, the downward trend reversed itself during the mid 1990s. In 
2001, the border effects in the Baltic States were between 11 and 15. It ranged from 11 
(Armenia) to 20 (Azerbaijan) in European republics; and from 54 (Turkmenistan) to 188 
(Tajikistan) in Central Asian republics; and it was 53 in the Russian Federation, and 97 in 
Ukraine (1999 figure).         
  Figure 2 depicts how the border coefficients change using various models suggested in 
the literature and this paper’s suggested model in equation (5). Panels (a) and (b) give the border 
coefficients for CEEC using McCallum’s (1995) model and Feenstra’s (2002) model. Panel (c) 
gives the coefficients based on the model in equation (5) that adds bilateral fixed effects to   10
Feenstra’s model and also has the advantage of only one regression rather than separate 
regressions every year.   
Comparison of border coefficients in panel (a) and (b) provides empirical evidence for 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2001)’s prediction that larger border effects result when there are 
omitted variables in the model. Results of McCallum’s (1995) model are smaller than the results 
of Feenstra’s (2002) model for all transition countries. This is due to the fact that the latter 
controls for multilateral resistance terms with the help of importer and exporter country fixed 
effects while the former omits these terms. Feenstra’s (2002) model resulted in particularly lower 
border effects for Bulgaria, and Hungary and the Czech Republic.  
The addition of bilateral fixed effects to control for the bilateral resistance terms of 
Anderson (1979) to the model in panel (c) leads to higher border coefficients as expected. While 
the relative positions of countries and the trends are more or less the same, the border 
coefficients in panel (c) are significantly higher than those in panel (b). Note that the impact of 
bilateral fixed effects has been particularly significant for the Czech and Slovak Republics. As 
expected, the addition of bilateral fixed effects to the model resulted in larger border effects for 
countries that tend to trade heavily with countries that are culturally close. The union of these 
two republics under Czechoslovakia for many decades provided the historical and cultural 
linkage. Although not shown the Figure 2, border effects under the model with bilateral fixed 
effects are also computed for other transition countries. The historical linkage under the Soviet 
Union has left FSR culturally close to each other, and made them natural trade partners. Thus, 
controlling these with bilateral fixed effects caused much higher border effects especially for 
FSR. Border coefficients ranged between 8 and 2 under McCallum’s (1995) model as given in   11
Figure 1 panel (c), whereas they range between 16 and 4 under the model with bilateral fixed 
effects.  
In general, the same downward trend is observed in panel (c). Like in figure 1, the trend 
in FSR, reverses itself in mid 1990s, with the exception of the Baltic States. These states 
experience the same gradual downward trend observed in CEEC.  In 2001, the ratio of domestic 
trade in CEEC to their international trade ranged from 138 in Hungary to 1440 in Romania. The 
border effect was 95 in the FYR of Slovenia, and 130 in the Russian Federation. Consistent with 
the findings in the literature, the border effects in larger countries such as the Russian Federation 
are much smaller than other smaller countries of the FSR.   
  Figure 3 gives the relative border effects (-
g
ijt λ ) in transition countries against country 
blocs using the model in equation (6). The country blocs considered are the EU, FSR and FYR. 
Accordingly, as seen in panel (a), above average border effects against the fifteen EU countries 
in CEEC gradually decreased to be below average by 2001 as reflected by negative coefficients. 
In other words, the border effects in CEEC against their EU partners are smaller relative to their 
other partners. Panels (b) and (c) compare the relative border effects against the EU countries in 
Baltic States of FSR to other FSR. In both sets of transition countries, the trend is downward, and 
the countries start with above average relative border effects and end up with below average 
border effects. The notable exception to this downward trend is Russia, which started with below 
average border effects against the EU relative to its other partners and increased gradually to 
become above average in 2001. The border effects were much higher in other FSR (especially in 
Kyrgyzstan) against the EU relative to those in Baltic States in 1992. Furthermore, the decrease 
in border effects was much sharper for Baltic States, which ended up with significantly below   12
average border effects against the EU relative to their other partners. In 2001, only in Moldova, 
the relative border effects were somewhat comparable to those in the Baltic States.  
  Relative border effects against the FSR are compared among Baltic FSR, CEEC and 
other FSR in panels (d)-(f). FSR borders were and remained above average for all transition 
countries relative their other partners. The only exception is the Russian Federation, which 
experienced below average relative FSR borders during the whole period of analysis. For Baltic 
FSR, relative FSR borders were higher than those observed in other FSR and even higher for 
CEEC. The trend was increasing at first for CEEC, which becomes slightly decreasing in the 
second half of the period of analysis. A slightly decreasing trend is observed in the Baltic FSR, 
whereas the same slightly decreasing trend clearly reversed itself in other FSR in mid 1990s.    
  FYR border effects of CEEC and FYR relative to their other partners are plotted panels 
(g) and (h). For both Slovenia and Macedonia, border effects against other FYR were below 
average at the beginning of the period of analysis. These relative border effects gradually 
increased throughout. Although by 2001, their relative border effects against the FYR were still 
below average, their other partners are gradually closing the gap. For CEEC, relative border 
effects against the FYR remained above average for the whole period of analysis. Although the 
trend was a relative decrease in early 1990s, the gap in border effects gradually widened with 
FYR relative to CEEC’s other partners.       
  Lastly, the model in equation (7) is applied to measure sectoral variation in border effects 
in transition countries with time. While Hungary and Slovenia have the lowest border 
coefficients in all of the sectors, Romania and Serbia have the highest coefficients among 
transition countries plotted. Generally speaking, a downward trend in border coefficients 
observed in earlier results also exists in this sectoral study. FSR like Latvia and Ukraine started   13
relatively high sectoral border coefficients, but experienced sharper decreases, especially Latvia, 
while Ukraine’s border coefficients remained relatively high. Border coefficients are lowest in 
machinery and equipment, and the textiles and apparel sectors. Resource intensive sectors such 
as paper, non-metallic mineral, and basic metal sectors still have relatively high border 
coefficients.  
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
The explanations for the existence and size of border effects provided in the literature can 
be organized under two somewhat related categories: trade costs and behavioral responses to 
trade costs.  
Trade costs consist of trade barriers including tariffs, non-tariff and technical barriers, 
different standards, custom and regulatory differences, search costs, transaction costs, 
communication costs, product specific information costs and exchange rate variability. Hillberry 
(1999) states that none of tariffs, regulations, and communication costs are significant factors on 
border effects. Head and Mayer (2000) found no correlation between non-tariff barriers and the 
border effect. Wei (1996) could not relate the exchange rate variability to border effect. 
However, Chen (2002) found that technical barriers and product specific information costs 
increase the border effect. Separately, Rauch (1999) found that search costs lead to higher border 
effects. 
Spatial agglomeration of firms, elasticity of substitution among varieties, and availability 
of products for exports can be counted as factors leading to border effects under behavioral 
responses to trade costs category. Evans (2001) measured that half of the border effects are due 
to the fact that fewer goods are available for exports. Similarly, spatial clustering of firms, and a 
high degree of substitution imply higher border effects.    14
This paper measured the border effects in transition countries and compared its size 
across countries, blocs of partner countries and sectors. Although all countries analyzed in this 
paper were members of CMEA and isolated from the rest of the world for many decades, the 
legacy of previous integrations and the route they have chosen in disintegration appear as 
important factors explaining the variation in the size of border effects across countries, especially 
when the effects are compared across blocs of partner countries and sectors.  
Domestically oriented infrastructure yields high border effects for FSR and FYR against 
their new partners, but significantly lower effects for their old partners. There were other 
contributing factors leading high border effects: central planners’ preference for specialization 
and lack of incentives to innovate under socialism. Furthermore, under central planning, 
enterprises had a very limited impact on their location decisions (Cieslik, 2004). These resulted 
in spatially agglomerated industries and low quality products which are not marketable, or 
available for exports, to new partners. Furthermore, especially for FSR, past linkages, such as 
infrastructure, business networks, production and consumption chains have been important 
factors (Djankov and Freund, 2000). These and other legacies of socialism, such as technology 
(resource-intensive production), appear as important factors in the explaining the size of border 
effects. Considering that technology and infrastructure are slow to change, their impact will be 
observed for a long period of time.    
The route transition countries chose in disintegration vastly differs from one another. 
Despite being FSR, the Baltic States’ efforts in disintegration resulted in significant reductions in 
their border effects, especially against the EU. Similar observations are made for Slovenia in 
comparison to other FYR. Product specific information cost and search costs in these countries 
were significantly reduced by their involvement in EU enlargement. Even within this group of   15
transition countries, the approach to the removal of barriers to trade varies (Manchin and Pinna, 
2004). In contrast, the initial general decreasing trend in FSR border effects reversed itself with 
the formation of CIS and CISCU. These two arrangements seem to have generated a force 
against the disintegration from the former Soviet Union.      
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Table 1. Integration and disintegration of transition countries 
Note: For country blocs that ceased to exist, their last year of existence is specified. For newly formed 
blocs, the first year of existence is listed.  
 
 
Country  CZSK   FYR  CEFTA   EU   FSR  CIS  CISCU 
 
Armenia      1991  1992   
Azerbaijan      1991  1992 
Belarus      1991  1992  1994 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    1991   
Bulgaria    1999  1995 
Croatia   1991 
Czech  Rep.  1992   1993 1995 
Estonia     1998 
Georgia      1991  1992 
Hungary    1993  1994 
Kazakhstan      1991  1992  1994 
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Macedonia   1991 
Moldova      1991  1992 
Poland    1993  1994 
Romania    1998  1995 
Russia      1991  1992  1994 
Serbia and Montenegro    1991 
Slovakia  1992   1993 1995 
Slovenia    1991 1996 1999 
Tajikistan      1991  1992  1999 
Turkmenistan      1991  1992 
Ukraine      1991  1992 
Uzbekistan      1991  1992 
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Figure 1. Border coefficients in Former Soviet Republics using various 
measures of internal distance 
ES: Estonia; KY: Kyrgyzstan; KZ: Kazakhstan; LT: Latvia; RU: Russian Fed.; 
UR: Ukraine 
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Figure 2. Border coefficients in Central and Eastern Europe  
under various models 
BG: Bulgaria; CZ: Czech Rep.; HU: Hungary; PL: Poland;  
RO: Romania; SK: Slovak Rep. 
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(c) Model with bilateral fixed effects
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Figure 3.  Relative border coefficients against country blocs 
FSR: Former Soviet Republics; FYR: Former Yugoslav Republics; EU: 15 
European Union members; Baltic FSR: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Other FSR: 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine; CEEC: 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovak Republic. 
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Figure 4. Sectoral border coefficients in select transition countries 
Note that Czech and Slovak republics, and Estonia are also plotted. 
BG: Bulgaria; HU: Hungary; PL: Poland; RO: Romania; LT: Latvia; 
RU: Russian Fed.; SL: Slovenia; SR: Serbia and Montenegro;  
UR: Ukraine 
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Appendix 1. Availability of data 
 
 
Country   Trade   Production    Period  of  analysis 
Armenia   1992-2004  1994-2000    1994-2000 
Azerbaijan   1992-2004  1990-2001    1992-2001 
Belarus  1992-2004  N.A.     N.A. 
Bosnia  Herzegovina    1990-1991    N.A. 
Bulgaria     1980-2001    1980-2001 
Croatia    1992-2004  1986-1992    1992 
Czech  Rep.     1980-1989  &1993-2000  1993-2000 
Estonia  1992-2004  1992-2001    1992-2001 
Georgia   1992-2004  1998-2000    1998-2000   
Hungary   1976-2004  1963-2000    1976-2000 
Kazakhstan   1992-2004  1993-2000    1993-2000 
Kyrgyzstan   1992-2004  1989-2001    1992-2001   
Latvia    1992-2004  1986-2001    1992-2001 
Lithuania   1992-2004  1992-2001    1992-2001   
Macedonia   1993-2004  1987-1999    1993-1999 
Moldova   1992-2004  1986-2001    1992-2001 
Poland    1982-2004  1982-84,  1989-2000   1982-84,  1989-2000 
Romania   1985-2004  1985-2000    1985-2000 
Russian  Fed.     1992-2004  1992-2001    1992-2001 
Serbia  &  Montenegro  1992-2004 1994-2000     1994-2000  
Slovak  Rep.   1992-2004  1993-1999    1993-1999 
Slovenia   1992-3004  1992-2000    1992-2000 
Tajikistan   1992-2004  1992-2002    1992-2002 
Turkmenistan   1992-2004  1996-2000    1996-2000 
Ukraine   1992-2004  1992-1999    1992-1999 
Uzbekistan   1992-2004  N.A.     N.A. 
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Appendix 2. Manufacturing Sectors 
 
 
ISIC-rev 2  ISIC-rev 3     SITC- rev 1    Description 
31    1511-4, 1520,    01, 02, 03, 04, 05,  Manufactures of food, 
    1531-3, 1541-4,  06, 07, 08, 09, 11, 12  beverages and tobacco 
  1549,  1551-4,  1600 
32    0140, 1711-2,     61, 65, 83, 84, 85  Textile, apparel,  
1721-3,  1729-30,     and  leather   
1810-1820, 1911-2, 
1920,  2430       
33    2010, 2021-3,    63, 82      Wood, wood products,  
  2029-3610      and  furniture 
34   2101-2,  2109,     64    Paper,  paper  products, 
2211-2,  2219,  2221-2     and  publishing 
35    1010, 1020, 2310,  32, 33, 51, 52, 53, 54  Chemicals, petroleum, coal, 
    2320, 2330, 2411-3,  55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62  rubber, and plastic 
  2421-4,  2429,  2511 
  2519-20,  3140 
36   1030,  2610,  2691-6  66    Non-metallic  mineral 
  2699,  2720,  5239 
37    2710, 2720, 2731-2  67, 68      Basic metal industries 
  2891-2,  3710   
38    2213, 2230, 2811-3   69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75  Fabricated metal products,  
2893, 2899, 2911-5  76, 77, 78, 79, 87, 88  machinery, and equipment 
  2919,  2921-6,  2929, 
  2930,  3000,  3110, 
  3120,  3130,  3150, 
  3190,  3210,  3220, 
  3230,  3311-3,  3320 
    3330, 3410, 3420,  
  3430,  3511-2,  3520, 
  3530,  3591-2,  2599, 
  3694,  7250 
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